Abstract. We provide a characterization of plan recognition in terms of a general framework of belief revision and non-monotonic reasoning. We adopt a generalization of classical belief revision to describe a competence model of plan recognition which supports dynamic change to all aspects of a plan recognition knowledge base, including background knowledge, action descriptions and their relationship to named plans, and accumulating sets of observations on agent actions. Our plan recognition model exploits the underlying belief revision model to assimilate observations, and answer queries about an agent's intended plans and actions. Supporting belief states are determined by observed actions and non-monotonic assumptions consistent with background knowledge and action descriptions.
Introduction
Knowing the plan an agent is pursuing is important for several reasons. It allows us to predict actions the agent might take in the future, and it allows us to aid or hamper the agent by suggesting or even taking action alternatives.
In its simplest conception, a plan explains a sequence of actions if they comprise the plan. To recognize an observed set of actions as a plan rst requires that one establish a representation of plans as a named or similarly identi ed set or sequence of actions. With that plan representation and given a set of observed actions, a plan recognition system constructs the set of possible plans which explain the speci ed actions 7] .
Like all recognition tasks, the object to be recognized has to be described in terms of some number of components. Sentences are sequences of words, programs are sequences of instructions, and plans might simply be conceived as named sequences of actions. The concept of \sequence" is typically too simple however, and can be elaborated along at least two dimensions. First, a plan of any practical complexity will likely include alternative actions to accomplish the same subgoals (which turns any plan description into a tree or lattice). Second, any set of actions to accomplish any particular plan will typically have optional actions which serve only to embellish the goal; so there will be necessary and contingent actions for any practical plan.
Within this kind of situation, a plan recognition system must be able to use incomplete information to provide the required exibility. A general plan recognition system must be able to perpetually accept revised descriptions of a world in which actions take place, including changes to the observed relationships amongst actions and plans. To anticipate the behaviour of agents acting in a dynamic observable world, the plan recognition system must be able to hypothesize consistent plans. Within this kind of framework, it is unsurprising that non-monotonic reasoning and belief revision will provide a basis for reasoning in this kind of incomplete information context.
At least four di erent general plan recognition strategies exist in literature: parsing 15], inference under uncertainty 2], plausible inference 1] and circumscribing a hierarchical representation of plans using deduction 7] .
The method proposed here uses ideas related to at least the last three of these methods, developed within a framework for managing and reasoning about beliefs. We use the Ghose-Goebel belief change model to maintain a dynamic set of assertions that represent actions and relationships amongst actions and plans. This method explicitly supports reasoning with incomplete knowledge and for revision of the belief base with newly observed facts. Observed actions are assimilated within the belief revision system and, together with current beliefs about actions and their a ects, constrain the plans that can be recognized. Additionally, The Ghose-Goebel reasoning framework supports the maintenance of multiple mutually inconsistent states of the world, providing a basis to assume alternative hypothetical completions of plans.
What Must Plan Recognition Do?
To help make our intuition clear, and as a basis for elaborating speci c details, we begin by assuming that any plan recognition system has to be able to both accept observations about a changing world, and make predictions about what could plausibly take place in that world. To help make these ideas concrete, we rst assume that we could use a goal-directed logic programming reasoning system like Prolog to de ne the top level functionality of a generic belief revision system. This generic system would have to interpret the following relations:
{ observe(Action, Situation) We can assert that a particular action has been observed in a particular situation. { predict(Action, Situation) We can query the system to determine if it is reasonable to expect a certain action in a particular situation. Note that the idea of being able to predict the next anticipated action can be elaborated to the more familiar plan recognition relation as follows: if we assume that plan recognition takes place in the context of a plan library consisting of named sequences of actions, e.g., plan(planName; a 1 ; a 2 ; :::; a n ]) (1) then we can generalize predict(Action; Situation) to the more familiar output of conventional plan recognition systems, namely predictPlan(Plan; Situation) (2) We expect our non-monotonic reasoning system to assume consistent hypotheses based on observations, and to provide us with the names of plans that could plausibly be considered as those intended by an agent that had carried out some number of the actions in the given situation.
Here we want the underlying belief revision system to process observations as expansions, contractions or revisions, and then be able to produce predictions based on existing plan libraries. The predictions could be in the form of guessing what action might be next attempted by an observable agent, or in the form of a named plan, whose actions somehow consistently subsume those already observed.
To be a little more speci c, we can begin with the following de nitions:
{ observedAction(Action; Situation). True when Action has been observed in Situation, e.g., observedAction(getGun; s 1 ). { observedFluent(Fluent; Situation). True when Fluent has been observed in Situation, e.g., observedFluent(isInBank; s 3 ). { predictAction(Action; Situation). True if there is a belief state consistent with Situation and Action is possible in that state. e.g., Action = goToBank, Situation = result(getGun; s 2 ) { predictPlan(Plan; Situation). True if the plan library contains a de nition of Plan in a form which associates Plan with a list of actions which comprise it: plan(Plan; a 0 ; a 1 ; : : :; a n ]). Furthermore, the preconditions or consequences of actions comprising the plan but not yet observed must hold or be assumable. To explore the ideas of how non-monotonic reasoning plays a role in plan recognition, note that if the preconditions or consequences of unobserved actions are at least assumable, the the plans associated with those actions are plausible.
predictPlan(Plan; Situation) ( (3) (plan(Plan; a 0 ; a 1 ; : : :; a i ; a i+1 ; : : :; a n ])); arePossibleOrAssumable( a 0 ; a 1 ; : : :; a i ; a i+1 ; : : :; a n ]; Situation) If the actions a 1 ; : : :; a i have been observed, it may be non-monotonically feasible to assume that Plan is a plan if it can be veri ed that the actions a i+1 ; : : :; a n may be taken from Situation, or that the consequences of required but unobserved actions are themselves assumable. As long as no information contradicts such assumptions for actions a i+1 ; : : :; a n , Plan is plausible. This is analogous to saying that the enabling conditions and a ects are not required to hold or be observed, but only to be possible. This is true if nothing would make these actions impossible 10].
3 Motivation for plan recognition competence based on belief revision and non-monotonic reasoning Current techniques used for solving the plan recognition problem deal with static knowledge bases, where a plan library already exists and the relationships amongst its comprising actions are known. In such systems, certain heuristics are applied to recognize viable plans. Carberry's focusing heuristic 1] hypothesizes a set of viable plans, selects the \best" one and incorporates it into the context model. Kautz 7 ] presents yet another heuristic used for selecting plans amongst multiple plausible plans.
The Ghose-Goebel belief revision framework allows the maintenance of all feasible plans which are recognizable, based on given observations. Eventually, and in any practical situation, such preferences for particular plans will be captured as epistemic entrenchment conditions 11]. We claim it is unnecessary and in fact dangerous to make a premature commitment to some plausible plan, when in fact all the possible plans ought to be presented to re ect the competence of a plan recognition system. This is consistent with the belief revision principle of informational economy which states that belief states should change in such a way as to maintain the maximal amount of information from state to state 3].
By using the techniques developed in belief revision, we explicitly allow for our knowledge base to consist of incomplete knowledge. We incorporate new observations into our knowledge base using the belief revision expansion, revision and contraction operators 3, 4, 12]. Our plan library is therefore dynamic. This mimics a more natural temporal varying behaviour of beliefs: in every reasonable possible world changes occur. As observations are made, the plausibly inferred plans are re ected in incrementally determined belief states.
Notation
Before discussing further details, we informally describe some of the key components of our chosen representation. We use a version of situation calculus syntax based roughly on work by Lifschitz 9] and Kowalski 8] .
We make use of three predicates: holds, observed and goal. The predicate holds allows us to describe each state in terms of uents which are claimed to be true in a state.
A knowledge base or plan library is a collection of axioms. These axioms describe actions, action a ects, and relationships amongst uents, actions, and plans. A belief state is a situation represented by constant symbols, e.g., s 0 or by composite terms result(a; s 0 ) when a denotes an action. A uent is a truth function de ned on a state: holds(hasGun(Fred); s 0 ) is a uent denoting the fact that Fred has a gun in state s 0 , while :holds(isInBank(Fred); s 2 ) is a uent denoting the fact that in state s 2 Fred is not in the bank. An action is an n-ary function from states to states, e.g., as in the agent named \Fred" in the action getGun, here asserted to have taken place in state s 1 : holds(hasGun(Fred); result(getGun (Fred); s 1 ) ). The simplest form of a plan is a sequence of actions leading from some state to some subsequent state. Actions are contained in a plan if a plan explains them: e.g., goal(toHunt; s 0 ) holds(getGun(Fred); s 0 ); this simple one action plan \to hunt" is one explanation for the the \get a gun" action 9].
The holds relation also allows us to describe relations amongst actions and uents by specifying state axioms, e ect axioms and frame axioms. See examples 7, 8 and 9.
The observed uent serves the purpose of distinguishing facts which we have not \seen" an agent perform from facts which we have already included into our knowledge base. See example 10.
Finally, the predicate goal allows us to de ne a relationship between plan names and a situation, and can be viewed as a plan recognition-speci c instance of a non-monotonic derivability relation like that used, for example, in hypothetical reasoning systems like Theorist 13, 14] . Example 11 expresses the relation that it is plausible that one has the goal robBank, in the situation resulting from the actions of getting a gun and going to a bank.
Integrating Plan Recognition with Belief Revision

The Ghose-Goebel Reasoning Model
Ghose and Goebel 5] developed a framework for the dynamics of belief change based on the idea that all observations (including mutually contradictory observations) are retained in a compact representation of multiple mutually inconsistent belief sets based on a non-monotonic representation system. Among other properties, this model has the property that all new beliefs are retained and simply treated as constraints on a possibly in nite set of consistent belief states. In terms of support for plan recognition, the intuition is that accumulating observations about actions are treated as constraints on possible belief states.
Unlike conventional belief revision systems, where each new observation forces a commitment to one new unique belief state, the model we adopt for plan recognition maintains multiple consistent belief states constrained by accumulating observations (see Figure 1) . 
Belief Revision operations
Belief revision is the process of changing a belief state according to some new information. As mentioned previously, there exist three operators which may be used to deal with changing beliefs in a belief state. Expansion (equation 4) deals with adding a new observation to the knowledge base. This might be a new action, some new relationships between actions and their a ects, or even a new plan. The idea lies in appending the knowledge base with new information which does not result in any portion of the knowledge base becoming inconsistent.
If a theory K is expanded by a fact x, commonly written K + x , then there is formed a union between the consequences of K and the new fact x.
Cn(K) + x = Cn(Cn(K) fxg) = Cn(K fxg) (4) Contraction (equation 5) deals with removing a fact x from theory K in such a way as to eliminate from K the possibility of deriving x. Therefore if x is accepted in K ?
x , it ought also be accepted in the intersection of K and K x . This is known as the Harper identity and de nes contraction in terms of revision. The idea lies in trying to eliminate from the knowledge base some fact which we see being invalidated through observation of the agent. If no evidence points towards the removal of a fact after its addition to a theory, such a fact ought not to be abandoned.
(5) Revision (equation 6) deals with adding a new fact x to a theory K as long as the new theory K x is consistent and closed under logical consequence 12]. It should be noted that minimal changes ought to be made to the theory which is being revised, in order to preserve the postulate of informational economy. The Levi identity may be employed to de ne revision in terms of contraction and expansion. It is important to keep in mind that revision will most likely result in multiple logical theories within our knowledge base, because there will most likely be multiple ways of contracting x.
Cn(K) x = Cn((K ? :x ) fxg) (6) 6 Representing Plans and Actions
To provide a concrete example, we provide further details based, again, on the style of Kowalski. Under that scheme, state description axioms are used to describe the status of all uents of a state. This information is used to determine which actions are possible in a state. The axioms here are roughly based on the problem discussed by Hanks and McDermott 6] . In this case, three uents are true: Fred is in the bank, has a gun, and the gun is loaded. This state of a airs is particular to state s 0 .
holds(isInBank(Fred); s 0 ) (7) holds(hasGun(Fred); s 0 ) holds(isLoaded; s 0 ) E ect axioms consist of action preconditions and postconditions. It is possible that certain preconditions and postconditions of actions be left unstated or will change from state to state based on observations of the agent's behaviour. Here described is the action getGun.
:holds(hasGun(X); S) ) (8) holds(hasGun(X); result(getGun(X); S)) :holds(isInBank(X); S) ) holds(isInBank(X); result(goToBank(X); S)) :holds(isLoaded; S) ) holds(isLoaded; result(loadGun; S)) Frame axioms specify uents which remain unchanged from state to state. The action getGun does not in uence the uents isInBank and isLoaded. Frame relationships not explicitly stated can be dealt with by using non-monotonic assumptions 5].
holds(isInBank(X); S)^holds(isLoaded; S) ) holds(isInBank(X); result(getGun(X); S))ĥ olds(isLoaded; result(getGun(X); S))
7 Plan Recognition System Behaviour as Belief Revision
The most basic operation which the plan library will undergo is Expansion or the addition of some new piece of information to the plan library. Before the consequences of Expansion can be analyzed, it is necessary to de ne the type of new information which could be appended to the plan library. Based on the notation of section 4 the plan library may be expanded with the following pieces of information: { A new Description Axiom. This is a uent which is consistent with all other
uents, yet provides new information to the plan library. { A new State Axiom. This is an axiom which de nes new universally true knowledge pertaining to each state of the world. { A new E ect Axiom. This is also an axiom which de nes the properties of actions. New preconditions or postconditions are added which change the behaviour of actions. { A new Frame Axiom. This axiom speci es unchanging uents over an action. { A New Plan. This is a new named sequence of allowable actions.
To continue our example, we assume an initial plan library (including the axioms speci ed in section 6) to demonstrate an operator of belief revision. To understand the intricacies of Expansion, the plan library must contain a set of uents, axioms and plans which will be appended with each of the above mentioned new types of information.
The (10) Revision and contraction are accomplished similarly, except that it is up to the belief revision system to maintain all information which has been revised, without unnecessarily discarding any information (see 5]).
Plan Recognition
One way a plan is ful lled is if all of the postconditions of actions which comprise the plan have been ful lled. To recognize possible plans in any given state, the postconditions of previously observed actions must be examined. These are expressed in terms of uents which describe any given state. In our case, the set of recognized plans will include all the plans whose comprising actions' postconditions are at least partially ful lled, as our non-monotonic interpretation of the goal predicate supports the \completion" of plans by consistent assumption.
As an example, consider the plan library consisting of the uents in example 7 and e ect axioms in example 8. The three uents are postconditions of the actions: goToBank, getGun and loadGun as shown by the e ect axioms.
Also given the following three plans: robBank, toHunt, toSwim; it is possible to recognize some of these plans based on the state description axioms provided. goal(robBank; result(goToBank(X); (11) result(getGun(X); s 0 ))) goal(toHunt; result(goToForest(X); result(getGun(X); s 0 ))) goal(toSwim; result(goT oPool(X); s 0 )) The state description axiom holds(isLoaded; s 0 ) does not play any role in recognizing plans, since it is not a postcondition of any actions which comprise the three plans. The axiom holds(hasGun(X); s 0 ) is the postcondition of the action getGun which is a part of two plans. The plans robBank and toHunt must therefore be recognized since there exists evidence which supports both of them. Furthermore, the axiom holds(isInBank(Fred); s 0 ) is a postcondition of the action goToBank, which gives even more evidence for recognizing the plan robBank.
Given this information, it is possible to recognize two of the three plans, because evidence exists which supports these two plans. The plan robBank has most evidence (two postconditions are satis ed), the plan goHunt has only one postcondition satis ed. Both plans should however be recognized because evidence supporting both of them is present. Some form of epistemic entrenchment 11] would provide the basis for ranking plausible plans.
